Conversations with John Shepherd: A True Class on Sociology of Music

by Antenor Ferreira Corrêa (Universidade de Brasília)*

John (Charles) Shepherd is musicologist, sociologist, anthropologist, born in England (Surrey, January 25th 1947) and naturalized Canadian 1972. He was research fellow 1975-9 at Manchester Polytechnic and taught 1981-4 at Trent University. In 1984 he began to teach music and sociology at Carleton University, where he introduced courses in popular music and where in 1989 he became director of the Centre for Research on Culture and Society. Later, in 1991, Shepherd became the founding director of Carleton's School for Studies in Art and Culture. Extract of “The Canadian Encyclopedia”. Article by Barclay Mcmillan and Betty Nygaard King.


Introduction

No one questions the fact that music is indeed a cultural phenomenon. Consequently, this music must to hold a meaning within the social structure where a particular music is produced. Obviously, throughout history is possible to observe music has acquired many functions, such as being accompaniment to theater and dance, constituting itself as entertainment or even attend to ritualistic and religious purposes.

However, it is possible to deepen this subject if we think of music beyond these more apparent functions, focusing on the most essential elements of musical constitution, sound and the formal framework that establishes it and makes it recognizable as music.

These reflections became the material of studies conducted by one of the leading social scientist and thinkers on music: John Shepherd. Dr. Shepherd is a researcher whose name is unconditionally associated with the field of study known as social theory of music, and which came to influence various works and authors in this area. Dr. Shepherd is the author of a vast intellectual production

* antenorferreira@yahoo.com.br
and has been able to advance in the studies that involve the social constitution of
music, thus providing a theoretical framework that helps us to consider complex
questions of music making and its social unfolding.

Among the subject matter considered by Dr. Shepherd, the relation between
sound, structure and construction of musical meaning in the orb of a culture,
occupy a prominent place. According to him, if all human action and thought are
socially constituted, then musical structures and sounds have social significance.
In this way, the meanings articulated through the structures and sounds of music
can be socially constituted. Therefore, it is relevant to understand to what extent
musical structures and practices reflect, model or resonate identities, experiences,
or structural positions of social classes, genres and ethnic groups. Interesting
questions could be devised on this regard, such as, is not the construction of
meanings also a social practice? In this sense, would not the creation of meanings
be shaped by the relations of power existing within that society? How, then, are
semiotic systems shaped by social interests and ideologies, and how are they
transformed and adapted to the changes that have taken place in this society?

In the pages that follow, I describe the conversations I had the privilege to
engage with Dr. Shepherd. It was possible to clarify many points concerning his
intellectual propositions. We approach aspects related to the process of
signification in music, the ideas of Leonard Meyer, we consider the scientific
framework for the establishment of a social theory of music, and we finish talking
about interculturality in music. It was possible to deepen and detail several aspects
of Dr. Shepherd insights.

The result is a true class on the topic of sociology of music.

Antenor Ferreira Corrêa: You have dedicated many years to the cultural study of
music. I understand one of the questions that have motivated your reflections on this matter
is “how music structures and musical practices reflect social aspects?” I would like to address
this subject here as well. However, before we go, I want to tell you a fact that struck me.
Yesterday, I read again your chapter “Music and Social Categories” (2003), and right in the
beginning, you informed to the readers that the question above mentioned has been researched
since at least 30 years and produced an impressive literature. Well, just for curiosity, yesterday
(April 1st) I googled “social theory of music” and I have 10 results (only 3 out these relevant
to the theme). Then, I did the same search on google scholar, that gave me 42 results, but
excluding the repetitions and articles not directly related to the theme, I found 5 useful texts.
I did the same on JSTOR, and I got 8 results (some of them the same texts I got in the 2
previous searches). These numbers of results does not seem as vast as mentioned, don’t you
think?
I think it remains the case that, over the last 40 years or so, the amount of literature exploring the presupposition that music is in some way socially and culturally constituted and therefore imbricated in some ways by social structures and social practices has been quite substantial. I think the real issue is that searching under the category of a “social theory of music” may not produce the results that you are looking for, strange as this may seem.

When *Music as Social Text* was published in 1991, I was attempting to demonstrate similarities between social structures and musical structures with respect to medieval plainchant, “classical” music and some forms of “popular” music. The methodology involved something known as the “structural homology”, the idea that, because it was possible to draw parallels between musical structures and social structures, this somehow established and demonstrated the social character of music. This work could therefore be viewed as being consistent in some ways with a general understanding of what a “social theory of music” might look like.

However, the notion of the structural homology was subsequently criticized, and justifiably so. This criticism was based on two arguments in particular: that the fit between social structures and musical structures was made too far too easily, seemed far too convenient, and did not account for the diverse and quite complex ways in which individuals used music; that the notion provided no understanding of how the social got into the musical or, as importantly, how the musical got into the social. This meant that, although there was continuing and significant interest in understanding music as being an essentially social phenomenon, the ground of explorations began to shift away from something that could commonly be regarded as “social theory” to other, more particular intellectual areas in sociological thought. A dominant characteristic of these explorations was a tension between social scientists, who felt that musicologists, in making connections between musical conventions and social practices, did so in ways that did not stand up to the demands of empirical sociology, and musicologists, who felt that social scientists failed to account for the specificities of music in their accounts of how musical practices are also social practices. Empirical sociology and the material and technical specificities of music seem far removed from what is commonly regarded as “social theory”.

I don’t think that this tension has ever been satisfactorily resolved in a generally recognized way. However, a book that Peter Wicke and I authored in 1991, *Music as Social Text*, does, in our opinion, resolve the difficulties generated by the structural homology as a methodology as well as the tension between sociological and musicological approaches to the social character of music. It does so, however, by concentrating on the individual subject as socially and culturally constituted as the essential mediator of music as a social phenomenon, which moves the intellectual territory even further away from what is commonly regarded as “social theory”. Additionally, a useful advance on these challenges coming from social scientists based on notions of materiality and mediation can be found in the work of Tia DeNora, Antoine Hennion and Georgina Born. This work, again, looks on the whole quite closely at
the individual subject as socially and culturally constituted as the essential mediator of music as a social phenomenon.

So, the short answer to your question is that there is an abundance of work on the social character of music. However, it is unlikely to be found under the very general character of the “social theory of music”. In order to understand the intellectual territory you wish to explore, I can strongly recommend the Introduction to the Routledge Reader on the Sociology of Music, published in 2015 and edited by Kyle Devien and myself. This will trace all the developments summarized here, as well as provide a comprehensive bibliography. The two most relevant sections of this Introduction are those on Music as Social Meaning and Music, Materiality and Mediation.

One final comment: I don’t think I have ever claimed that music simply “reflects” the social. I have always regarded musical and social activities as interpenetrating in quite complex ways with music contributing as much to the formation and expression of social processes as it contributes in articulating them. In fact, I have for quite some time argued that problematizing the “relationship” between music and society as a relationship that needs understanding represents a false problematization. As I have argued for a long time, positing “the social” as something extrinsic to music that then affects it is to engage in a false presumption. To the contrary, music is inherently social, and inherently social in its own was and on its own terms that distinguishes it from other forms of social activity. This way of thinking goes back to Chapter Two of Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Languages (published in 1977), “The ‘Meaning’ of Music”, and the work of Raymond Williams in The Long Revolution.

AFC: From the results I have got in my searches described in question 1, your book Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Languages (1977) is a common denominator. This book is always quoted, reviewed, and recommended. Your other books and articles are likewise quite often mentioned. Do you believe to have reached a formulation for a social theory of music? To what extent is possible to “read” or to understand a society (or a social group) through its music?

JS: I do believe that I have reached a formulation for a social theory of music, but one that would probably not be subsumed under the intellectual category of “social theory”. This formulation is contained in Music and Cultural Theory. However, I do not believe that it is possible to “understand a society (or a social group) through its music” as you put it. This way of thinking about the social character of music is, in my opinion, too simplistic. This is because neither a “society” nor a “social group” exist as phenomena extrinsic to music. As I said in my answer to your first question, music is inherently social and inherently social in its own particular ways that respect the material and technical specificities of music as a form of human expression and communication. In this it will certainly articulate common features of broader social processes (each of which will evidence its own specific characteristics), “reflect” them, if you like, through these commonalities. But it will also contribute to these
broader social processes in its own specific ways that will not be entirely reducible to these
commonalities. This is really what is at issue in the question you ask. Music can to a degree
provide a window on broader social processes, but this “window” has to be understood in
terms both of what music is contributing to a society or social group, and of the complex
relations that exist between music as an inherently social form of human expression and
communication and these broader social processes. In this, the fundamental foundation and
mediator of music’s sociality is individual people as socially constituted subjects. This is a
basic premise of *Music and Cultural Theory*.

**AFC.** The attempts to provide a social theory (a framework for analyzing and to explain a
society or a social group) have produced several models of thinking, such as interactionism,
symbolic functionalism, critical theory, Marxism, among others. Differently, we do not
observe a similar variety of proposals or models dedicated to explaining this social
phenomenon called music. You even mentioned the “lack of theoretical protocol for
underwriting the link between the sounds of music and the social and cultural affects, the
social and cultural identities” (1997: 2). Isn’t it a kind of paradox? Because, on the one hand,
one can observe an astonishing musical diversity in the world, and, on the other hand, it seems
to me this variety is comprehended according to a single (or at least a small number)
thetical set.

**JS.** I think it is true to say that, in fact, practically every school of sociology has had
something to say about music. I accounted for this in the entry on the sociology of music in
on the Sociology of Music* also accounts for this comprehensive diversity in terms of
contemporary work in the sociology of music. Even structural functionalism had its say in the
work of Alphons Silbermann (1963). Work on the social character of music has also come
from many intellectual trajectories not explicitly sociological in character, such as feminism
and poststructuralism. These intellectual trajectories are also covered in *Music and Cultural
Theory* and the Introduction to *The Routledge Reader on the Sociology of Music*.
The single theoretical set to which you refer is concerned not with music as a social
phenomenon more broadly, but with the more specific issue of meaning in music as socially
and culturally constituted. Even then, there are a variety of approaches and debates around
the issue of meaning in music as socially and culturally constituted which amount to more
than just a single theoretical set (or a small number of sets). These approaches and debates,
the broader sociological context for explorations of this more specific issue of meaning in
music as socially and culturally constituted, as well as other aspects of music as a social
phenomenon are rehearsed in the Introduction to *The Routledge Reader on the Sociology of
Music*. 
The issue of meaning in music is a constant in your texts. You approached this matter considering the proposals of Leonard Meyer and Susanne Langer (I will come back to it). I totally understand the importance of this matter, and, to start, I think it is not too far to accept that a social group, in the making of its music, would choose sounds which contain some significance to this society. Regarding this assumption, I’d like to remember Jean-Jacques Rousseau (in the Encyclopédie). He proposed something that for me was not fully pondered in the literature when considering meaning in music. He understood vocal inflections as being prior to the speech in the human evolutionary chain. As soon as humanoids have adapted and acquired the capability of speech those inflections were not dismissed but channeled to a “new” form of expression: the music. Thus, couldn’t those vocal inflections be a good start point to investigate the origins of meaning in music?

This is a very tricky area with which to engage and arguments, of necessity, remain speculative. My own opinion is that “vocal inflections” as you describe them are fundamental to both language and music, not just music. In this respect and others, I have never ascribed a priority to language over music as a form of human expression and communication. My feeling is that both “language” and “music” as we understand them (and many societies do not have these linguistic and epistemological categories—they understand all forms of human vocalizations quite differently) developed from the vocalizations of animals, then pre-humans and so on. In Music and Cultural Theory, we hint strongly at this understanding and argue that language and music, as we understand them, have an essentially symbiotic relationship and are mutually co-dependent on one another. This leads to the realization that the real issue is to understand sound as a form of human technology that can be used in different ways by humans. In the final chapter of Music and Cultural Theory, we argue that sound as a form of human technology can be used in three ways as a medium of expression and communication: sounds imitate other sounds; sounds call forth categories of expression and communication with which the sounds have no intrinsic relationship (“language”); sounds call forth forms of expression and communication with which they do have an intrinsic relationship (“music”). These arguments constitute the foundations of my understanding of the origins of meaning in music and the relationship of music to language.

“Music encodes and articulates social meanings”. You demonstrated this point in a comprehensive way. Admitting music as a cultural creation (in the sense that music is produced and validated within and by a social group), we can assume that, from all inventions appeared in this society, the group would keep those considered as useful or meaningful in some sense. At this point, music could be both: useful (for producing trance, comping the rites or dance, etc.) and meaningful (to move people in an emotive, and/or subjective, way). The concept of structural homology could be a common ground to explain these both aspects and to bear a social theory of music?
JS: I agree that the structural homology can be used in this way. However, I think that its use (bearing in mind my reply to question 1) has either to be restricted to understanding the relationship between sounds recognized as musical and the somatic forms of awareness of each individual subject as socially and culturally constituted, or at least used in a way at a greater level of generality that involves groups of humans which understands that analyzing the relation between sounds recognized as musical and a group of humans has to be grounded in the relationship between these sounds and each individual in the group. This is because each relationship between these sounds and each individual will, to a degree, and to a degree only, be distinctive. What emerges, therefore, are commonalities apparent in each of these relationships that can give rise to a general statement without each relationships being reduced to one unvarying commonality (that is, being reified). The theorizations contained in Music and Cultural Theory are fundamental to this approach. Georgina Born’s article “Music and the Materialization of Identities” (2011) is also instructive in this regard.

AFC: Structural homology shows structural characteristics of the music (such as tonality, form, meter, melody, melodic system, phraseology) that are common to quite different social groups. If we take, for example, the cyclic aspect implied in tonal music (the return to home), we will see this feature is also present in Gregorian chants and nowadays-popular music. Likewise, the return to tonic or any acoustic pole is observed in the music of indigenous people (see music file I’ve attached, which is modal, but returns to the initial base note) and many folk traditions around the world. Likewise, song form (alternating between chorus and refrain) is a constant in many types of cultures. In this sense, we are taken similar music structures (centricity and cyclic attribute, in this case) to deal with (or to try to comprehend) dissimilar societies. Do you see this as a problem? [Another example of this kind of analysis, just to illustrate my point, is taken from Susan McLaren. She claims that tonality has “constructed musical analogs to such emergent ideals [from Enlightenment] as rationality, individualism, progress, and centered subjectivity” (2000: 65)].

JS: No – I don’t see this as a problem. However, I’m not sure that I agree that there is always a “home” in Gregorian chant that is the same as, or even strongly similar to, the “home” in functional tonal music, or that there is always a home in the extremely wide range of music that can be covered by the term “popular”. Also, when one claims that there is a “return to [a] tonic or an(y) acoustic pole” in “indigenous music” (which additionally covers a very wide range of music), one has to ask who is doing the analysis, non-indigenous or indigenous people from the culture in question?

The real point here is that a certain set of sonic characteristics recognized as musical will be capable of articulating a range of socially and culturally constructed meanings. Not all social and culturally constructed meanings can be embedded a certain set of such sonic characteristics, but neither can a certain set of such sonic characteristics be reduced to only one set of socially and culturally constructed meanings. Sonic characteristics recognized as
musical do not, in other words, determine social meanings. A crucial issue that lies behind the question you ask, therefore, is “what analyst, and from what social group, is ascribing social meanings to the musical characteristics in question, and what exactly, are they hearing?” Different analysts can hear different meanings in the same sounds, in other words, depending on their social and cultural origins. A crucial question is: “Are the analysts from the same social group as the music being analyzed?”

**AFC.** In *Whose Music?* you emphasized the importance of the pentatonic structure for the plainchant and for some popular medieval songs. Later, you showed the replacement of this pentatonic structure with the tonality in post-Renaissance society. This replacement was due to a new ideology emerged in which we see the establishment of the industrial man, as you put. Max Weber (1995) pointed out that the baroque temperament as the great rationalization of western civilization. And, in fact, one can observe its impact until nowadays. Under a sociologic perspective, Is it not curious that we had to wait more than one century (from the *Fifth and Sixth Books of Madrigals* (1611) by Carlo Gesualdo, considered for some as the beginning of tonality until Bach *Well-Tempered Clavier* (1722)) to conciliate tonality and temperament (what allowed for modulations distant, and consequently, enhancing the expectation for the return to tonic) with the new ideology of the period?

**JS.** I think that the short answer is “no”! Social and cultural and therefore musical change tends to be slow and organic, and I don’t think that a century is a long time for such a development.

**AFC.** Meyer understood the mechanism of engendering (and discriminating) patterns is due to psychological constants (Gestalt theory). He even believed that the only true universal is what he called “biopsychological universals”. Thus, even though individuals belonging to different social groups do not attribute similar meanings to a music, they can be affected by this very same music. Could this feature be an evidence of this common psychological constant of our species?

**JS.** My view is “no”. I have analyzed and criticized Meyer’s views quite extensively in both *Whose Music* and *Music as Social Text*, and have attempted to explain as clearly as possible the gaps and omissions in his theories –these arguments are too detailed to rehearse here. I believe I have covered the phenomenon of individuals belonging to different social groups not attributing similar meanings to the “same” music but nonetheless being affected by this very same music (sounds!) in my answer to question 6 (you really mean the same “sounds” here, because music can only arise as an interaction between individuals and sounds recognized as musical –the same sounds do not necessarily “mean” the same “music”; please consult *Music and Cultural Theory*).
In the pre-literate world, the important customs and knowledge were transmitted through legends and music. This music should be structured through easy-to-remember formulas. In view of this, don’t you think it would be possible to hypothesize that these formulas have been consolidated over the centuries as recognizable brain patterns? These patterns, in turn, would form the basis of Meyer’s proposition for musical meaning, since once they could be recognizable, they would also be used to engender predictions of continuity and closure (which, inhibited or delayed, would generate the musical meaning).

I cannot agree with this view. The ways in which knowledge is preserved and articulated in purely oral cultures is, in fact, quite complex. In *Whose Music*, I refer to the work of Albert Lord (1964) in this respect. Knowledge is articulated and thus preserved through the rehearsal of certain vocal formulae which will change constantly through time give rise to utterances which to a degree are distinctive each time they occur. So I think that “easy-to-remember” may be misleading and actually, if you will forgive me, could be regarded as a formulation that is a bit condescending! These formulae do not tend, in my view, to be “consolidated over the centuries”, but will constantly develop organically and react to changing social and historical circumstances. In this sense, they could not form the basis of “recognizable brain patterns” in the sense of these having some form of recognizable and stable continuity.

Above and beyond this, however, I believe what you are suggesting ascribes an undue degree of influence to the brain which is, after all, a purely physiological phenomenon. The role of the “mind”, in comparison, raises different questions. The mind in my view is not reducible to the brain but arises out of interactions between the brain and the social and cultural interactions of individuals, which can vary significantly and widely. In this sense the brain is a facilitating rather than a generative phenomenon. Again in my view, there is nothing in the brain that contributes to musical meaning other than its role in facilitating and mediating a somatic awareness of individual human experience that interacts concretely and complexly with sounds recognized as musical. In short, there seems to be a current of determinism evident in the question which is ultimately incompatible with notions of individuals as socially and culturally constructed.

The habit of listening to music generates familiarity with different genres and styles. This familiarity induces the listener to predict and expect for probable developments and closure on the musical flow. The learning of (or familiarity with) a particular style occurs only in the realm of a culture. In this sense, is it not possible to say that Meyer did not totally disregard the role of culture in his understanding of the process of musical meaning?

He did not disregard it, but he did view the role of culture in a completely ethnocentric manner. A reasonable understanding of social processes as culturally relative rather than
having an hierarchical value in modern Western terms represents the single most important omission in his theories. Again, I did deal with these issues quite comprehensively in both *Whose Music?* and *Music as Social Text*. However, I do argue that Meyer (along with Suzanne Langer) advanced our understanding of meaning in music in some important ways. Yet their theories in my view remain nonetheless inadequate in understanding music as a socially and culturally constituted form of human expression and communication.

**AFC.** At the very end of *Music and Social Theory*, you claimed “consciousness can be articulated linguistically or musically” (1977: 217). In this sense, it will be possible to impute on music another function, that is, to stand as a mode to express one’s understanding of the world. To put it in other words: music is not only a useful device (to produce trance, for accompanying dance, etc.) or a way to give meaning to existence but also a form of expressing the understanding of the life.

**JS.** I would agree with this, in that most of the world’s music involves not only sounds recognized as musical, but words, images and movement. However, to reply more fully, I would have to know what you mean by an “understanding of life” as distinct from “awareness” or “consciousness”. Are not these integrally related if not co-terminous?

**AFC.** Yes, I agree that awareness or consciousness are very closely related to understanding. However, being a composer, make me also think about why people create music (perhaps, it is better to ask: why, in some moment in the course of evolutive chain, music was invented). For this reason, I see a slight variation when one wish to express his/her understanding of the world through music (or art). In this case there is a need or will implied. It’s more than just to get aware of, but to have a sort of pressing desire for expressing something that cannot be expressed or shown through words. And, this is a function of music.

**JS.** I can be brief on this one! I would agree that what separates music as we understand it—as well as other “art” forms—from more pedestrian forms of human communication and expression is a high degree of focused reflection. So music does go beyond simply being a “useful device” or simply giving rise to “meaning” (although this word does have to be treated carefully and with some qualification in discussing music) to becoming a form for reflecting on and understanding “life”, as you put it. However, it still remains the case that music encapsulates and articulates forms of awareness and consciousness as it does this. Additionally, I do have some sympathy for your statement that music can express “something that cannot be expressed or shown through words”. The reasons for this are, I believe, apparent from my answers to some of your other questions. However, I would put it rather differently. I would say that, because of the way that sounds in music work, music can directly encompass and articulate forms of reality (socially and culturally constituted affective realities) that
linguistic and visual forms of expression, whether or not “artistic” in character, can access only indirectly. By contrast, and equally, the sounds of music cannot denote directly (or, in most cases, even at all) objects and concepts. These can, however, be denoted directly by language and many forms of visual communication.

**AFC.** Interculturality (the interaction among people from different cultural contexts) is a current topic of interest not only by the artistic community but also by the scientific milieu. From the academic point of view, the importance of an intercultural experience is understood because it points out new perspectives to conceive old problems and to show different ways of dealing with contemporary issues. I think this is because interacting in diverse cultural domains creates situations, promotes reflections and brings out inspirations that would not be possible outside the intercultural experience. Nowadays, the world faces the dissonance between the process of globalization and the maintenance of cultural identity. This dilemma promotes reflections in different areas, and also discuss forms and methodological approaches to that matter. Do we have a “theoretic protocol” to deal with interculturality in the domain of music?

**JS.** I think that this “theoretic protocol” is implicit in some of the answers I have provided, in that individuals from different cultures can, to a degree, elicit different meanings from the same musical sounds which can then become the basis for what you describe as “interculturality”, which today is rampant through electronic media. For an empirical example (in the pre-social media age), I can strongly recommend Catherine Ellis’s book, *Aboriginal Music: Education for Living* (1985), in which there is a wonderful description of non-indigenous and indigenous students in a conservatory interacting through their respective musics.

A concern with interculturality has become increasingly important since the advent of high technology and the dramatic increase in the speed and effectiveness with which cultural artifacts, including music, are circulated. It has to be recognized, of course, that cultural artifacts have always circulated between civilizations and various social groups, and that there is as a consequence no one “pristine” point of social and cultural origin for any kind of music. It is likely that all musics are, to a certain extent, hybrid forms of music. Nonetheless, when this circulation was slow –a snail’s pace compared to what now occurs– it was possible, although certainly not without generating some legitimate intellectual concerns, to understand certain forms of popular music as being integrally associated in terms of production and consumption with certain social groups along lines of class, ethnicity and gender (for example). With the current speed and effectiveness with which cultural artifacts are circulated, it has become increasingly problematic, and legitimately so, to argue for such associations although, in certain circumstances, the assertion of such alliances may retain a degree –but a degree only– of legitimacy.

The bottom line in these kinds of discussions is the way in which sound in music works or,
at least, the way in which I have argued it works. Compared to sounds in language, where the sounds of language or, to put it more accurately, the sonic image of sounds in language (“signifiers”) have an arbitrary relationship with what they signify (mental concepts or “signifieds”), there is, with the sounds of music, a concrete and material relationship between the sounds and the affective states from which they flow and which they draw forth. With language, in other words, there need not be, and usually are not, characteristics in common between the sounds of words and the mental concepts (“signifieds”) customarily invoked by the sounds (“signifiers”). By contrast, the sounds of music and the affective states from which they flow and which they invoke do have substantial characteristics in common. This commonality does not, however, constitute a tight or “one-to-one” relationship. Depending on the character of the sounds, there is, to a certain, varying degree, a range of affective states that can be successfully visited on and drawn forth by the sounds of a particular musical event. To put it crudely, the range of states that can result in and be drawn forth by a piece of punk rock music and a Beethoven symphony are finite and likely highly incompatible. In other words, not all affective states can be visited on all musical sounds. So, if we can imagine the sounds of a piece of music originating from a musician’s affective states as they create the music, the affective states that various listeners or consumers associated complexly with various social groups can visit on the sounds can vary significantly from those from which the sounds of the music in question originate. However, the situation is far more complex than this, because popular music in particular, as Antoine Hennion has pointed out on more than one occasion, is rarely created by just one person: it results from teamwork involving not only more than one musician, but also producers, sound engineers and so on.

My view is that understanding how sounds in music work is important, but certainly not the only consideration, in understanding interculturality in music. How music works interculturally is complex and significantly so, but not all things are possible. In my original answer to question 11, I referred to Catherine Ellis’s book, Aboriginal Music: Education for Living, in which there is a wonderful example of aboriginal and non-aboriginal students in a conservatory attempting to enter each other’s social, cultural and affective realities through their respective musics. Equally important in these considerations, however, is Will Straw’s article, “Systems of Articulation, Logics of Change: Communities and Scenes in Popular Music” (1991). In this article, Straw takes issue with the notion of a “musical community”, a notion that can encompass the assumption that a particular musical tradition is both produced and consumed by a particular social group, and puts forward the concept of the “musical scene”, a concept which allows for the complexities I have identified, but a concept also that realizes that music not only articulates affective states that are socially and culturally constituted, but can act at the same time to draw together individuals from a variety of social and cultural circumstances into the same “scene”. Music is not only socially “reflective”; it is also socially “constitutive”. The concept of the “scene” still retains currency and is in my view highly useful in understanding interculturality in music.
Conversations with John Shepherd: A True Class on Sociology of Music.

Bibliography


Biography / Biografia / Biographia

Antenor Ferreira is a Brazilian composer, percussionist, researcher, and producer. He is Associate professor at University of Brasília (UNB). He holds PhD in music composition and
Master in music theory. He developed a Post-Doctoral research at University of California (UCR). He is the coordinator of Medialab (Laboratory of Computer Arts). He launched the following books: Music in an Intercultural Perspective (2016); The Musical Mind in an Interdisciplinary Perspective (2015, in Portuguese); Musical Analysis as Compositional Principle (2014, in Portuguese); (Post-tonal Harmonic Structures (2006, Portuguese). Currently he is preparing his 3rd CD and developing a Post-Doctoral research at University of Granada, Spain.

How to cite / Cómo citar / Como citar